Ordinary trade settles by payment: the buyer’s bank sends money to the seller’s bank, and the message passes through institutions that screen it. Settlement by offsetting works differently. Each side holds a claim on the other, or on an intermediary, and the claims are set against each other, so that less money moves, or money moves only inside one country. For a sanctioned economy that matters because a payment that never crosses a border never meets a correspondent bank. This page collects what US authorities and the FATF say about it. Their documents use the words offsetting, mutual settlement and clearing far more than “netting”, and that difference is noted at the end.
The mechanism, in the FATF’s description
The FATF and the Egmont Group describe offsetting in their 2020 report on trade-based money laundering. They call it a variation of the Black Market Peso Exchange, in which criminal groups or professional launderers who hold illicit cash cooperate with others who need cash1 . The report is about criminal proceeds, not sanctions. Read across to trade, the author’s reading is that the same structure lets two parties each receive value in their own country from the other’s counterparty, so that nothing crosses the border between them. The same report returns to a related point, that invoice settlement by an unknown third party is a constant feature of these schemes, and warns firms that they may be told to settle through an entirely unrelated third party2 .
The settlement logic is close to that of the informal value transfer systems on the hawala page, applied here to commercial invoices.
Russia: clearing platforms and payment agents
Regional clearing platforms. On 15 January 2025 Treasury said Russia and China had been working to set up regional clearing platforms in both countries to act as counterparties, allowing cross-border payments for sensitive goods3 . In Treasury’s words, the platforms facilitate non-cash mutual settlement for payments for sanctioned goods4 . It designated 15 entities and one individual, naming six Russia-based and nine PRC-based platforms, and said several US-designated Russian banks were reportedly participants. That is Treasury’s finding in a designation announcement, not a court judgment.
A bank as hub. In the same action Treasury designated Keremet Bank in the Kyrgyz Republic, which it said coordinated with Russian officials and a designated Russian bank to carry out transfers on that bank’s behalf. In Treasury’s description the purchase of Keremet was meant to create a hub for Russia to pay for imports and receive payment for exports5 .
A7. FinCEN’s October 2026 alert on the A7 Network gives the fullest description of an agent-based version, which the A7 case covers in detail. A customer gives A7 the supplier and trade documents; A7 then discharges the customer’s obligation through its own settlement mechanisms, including bills of exchange or promissory notes that record value inside the network6 . A “sub-agent” company outside Russia appears on the invoice and in the payment instruction. The sub-agents give A7 access to correspondent banking and foreign-currency liquidity, so value moves through the international system without a Russian or other sanctioned customer in the payment chain7 .
FinCEN describes the ruble-backed token A7A5 as an internal accounting method that moves between addresses to keep a balanced ledger8 , and says the tokens are used for transfers inside Russia that represent foreign payments9 . On one side of the ledger, then, tokens move inside Russia; on the other, sub-agents make the fiat payments abroad. The stablecoin settlement page covers the token.
Iran: settlements brokered by exchange houses
Treasury’s June 2025 announcement of designations on the Zarringhalam network describes a parallel banking system in which settlements are brokered through Iran-based exchange houses that use front companies outside Iran, mainly in Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates, to make or receive payments for sanctioned persons10 . FinCEN’s advisory of the same month adds the consequence: by using front-company accounts outside Iran to both receive and remit payments, sanctioned Iranian entities may be able to transact through the international financial system without ever repatriating funds to Iran11 . The mechanics of the exchange-house side are on the exchange house and rahbar networks page.
FinCEN’s May 2026 alert on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps carries the pattern into digital assets. One of its red flags is a customer of a digital-asset service provider who appears to be using the provider’s liquidity to carry out large numbers of offsetting transactions12 .
What offsetting does and does not remove
Offsetting reduces payments; it does not remove them. Whatever is left after claims are set against each other has to be paid, or carried forward as a debt. In the A7 description the fiat leg still runs through correspondent banks and SWIFT, which is why FinCEN’s alert is addressed to banks and asks them to look at that leg. In the Iranian cases the residual moves through front-company accounts that FinCEN says it can identify in Bank Secrecy Act data. This is the practical difference from gold and commodity barter, where the settlement asset itself leaves the banking system, and from plain third-country accounts, where the payment is real and only the party is disguised. In most of the documented cases netting is combined with those methods, not used in place of them.
How it is caught
- Reconcile the trade. Goods shipped should correspond to money received from, or sent to, the contracting party. A shipment paid for by a company with no stated role, or by a domestic transfer in the buyer’s own country, is a mismatch. The mirror statistics approach does this at country level.
- Look at the agent, not the buyer. FinCEN’s A7 alert lists money-laundering indicators for sub-agent transactions: unusually high volumes shortly after a company is formed, goods descriptions that do not fit the supplier’s profile, unusual routing through apparent shell companies, and falsified or AI-altered invoices.
- Use the designations. Treasury named the clearing platforms and the individual, and FinCEN has proposed a special measure aimed at A7’s sub-agents. Screening these names is the cheapest control, though the alert describes the sub-agents as numbering in the hundreds.
- Watch the digital leg. The IRGC alert’s offsetting flag is aimed at customers of digital-asset service providers who run large numbers of offsetting transactions and may have exposure to Iranian counterparts.
What the record does not show
- The word. None of the US documents collected here uses “netting”. The mechanism is called offsetting, mutual settlement, clearing or a ledger, and the match between these and a financial netting arrangement is the author’s reading. UK documents from the National Crime Agency, OFSI and OTSI that were searched did not describe it, and no EU or Venezuela-related document was found that does.
- Size. None of the sources says how much trade is settled this way. FinCEN’s A7 figures concern the volume the network processed, not how much was offset.
- Allegations and findings. The clearing-platform and A7 descriptions are Treasury and FinCEN findings in designation and advisory documents. The Treasury release calls the Russian banks “reportedly” participants, which is not a finding.
- Mechanics. The documents do not explain how residual balances between the platforms are cleared, or how the Russian and Chinese platforms agree exchange rates and prices.
- Current status. Whether the platforms named in January 2025 still operate under the same arrangements is not shown in these documents.