Sanctions Evasion Reference

How is sanctioned trade settled by offsetting, not payment?

Settling what trading counterparties owe one another by setting claims against each other, often through an intermediary or platform, so that little money crosses a border and fewer payment messages reach the banks that screen them.

also known as

offsetting, compensation, mutual settlement, netting, regional clearing platforms

seen in

Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Iran

reviewed

2026-11-16

Cite this page
APA 7
Sanctions Evasion Reference. (2026, November 16). How is sanctioned trade settled by offsetting, not payment? https://sanctionsevasion.org/techniques/netting-and-offset-settlement/
Chicago
Sanctions Evasion Reference. “How is sanctioned trade settled by offsetting, not payment?” Last reviewed November 16, 2026. https://sanctionsevasion.org/techniques/netting-and-offset-settlement/.
BibTeX
@misc{ser-techniques-netting-and-offset-settlement,
  author = {{Sanctions Evasion Reference}},
  title  = {How is sanctioned trade settled by offsetting, not payment?},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Last reviewed 2026-11-16},
  url    = {https://sanctionsevasion.org/techniques/netting-and-offset-settlement/}
}

The date is when this page was last reviewed, not when it was first published.

Ordinary trade settles by payment: the buyer’s bank sends money to the seller’s bank, and the message passes through institutions that screen it. Settlement by offsetting works differently. Each side holds a claim on the other, or on an intermediary, and the claims are set against each other, so that less money moves, or money moves only inside one country. For a sanctioned economy that matters because a payment that never crosses a border never meets a correspondent bank. This page collects what US authorities and the FATF say about it. Their documents use the words offsetting, mutual settlement and clearing far more than “netting”, and that difference is noted at the end.

The mechanism, in the FATF’s description

The FATF and the Egmont Group describe offsetting in their 2020 report on trade-based money laundering. They call it a variation of the Black Market Peso Exchange, in which criminal groups or professional launderers who hold illicit cash cooperate with others who need cash1 . The report is about criminal proceeds, not sanctions. Read across to trade, the author’s reading is that the same structure lets two parties each receive value in their own country from the other’s counterparty, so that nothing crosses the border between them. The same report returns to a related point, that invoice settlement by an unknown third party is a constant feature of these schemes, and warns firms that they may be told to settle through an entirely unrelated third party2 .

The settlement logic is close to that of the informal value transfer systems on the hawala page, applied here to commercial invoices.

Russia: clearing platforms and payment agents

Regional clearing platforms. On 15 January 2025 Treasury said Russia and China had been working to set up regional clearing platforms in both countries to act as counterparties, allowing cross-border payments for sensitive goods3 . In Treasury’s words, the platforms facilitate non-cash mutual settlement for payments for sanctioned goods4 . It designated 15 entities and one individual, naming six Russia-based and nine PRC-based platforms, and said several US-designated Russian banks were reportedly participants. That is Treasury’s finding in a designation announcement, not a court judgment.

A bank as hub. In the same action Treasury designated Keremet Bank in the Kyrgyz Republic, which it said coordinated with Russian officials and a designated Russian bank to carry out transfers on that bank’s behalf. In Treasury’s description the purchase of Keremet was meant to create a hub for Russia to pay for imports and receive payment for exports5 .

A7. FinCEN’s October 2026 alert on the A7 Network gives the fullest description of an agent-based version, which the A7 case covers in detail. A customer gives A7 the supplier and trade documents; A7 then discharges the customer’s obligation through its own settlement mechanisms, including bills of exchange or promissory notes that record value inside the network6 . A “sub-agent” company outside Russia appears on the invoice and in the payment instruction. The sub-agents give A7 access to correspondent banking and foreign-currency liquidity, so value moves through the international system without a Russian or other sanctioned customer in the payment chain7 .

FinCEN describes the ruble-backed token A7A5 as an internal accounting method that moves between addresses to keep a balanced ledger8 , and says the tokens are used for transfers inside Russia that represent foreign payments9 . On one side of the ledger, then, tokens move inside Russia; on the other, sub-agents make the fiat payments abroad. The stablecoin settlement page covers the token.

Iran: settlements brokered by exchange houses

Treasury’s June 2025 announcement of designations on the Zarringhalam network describes a parallel banking system in which settlements are brokered through Iran-based exchange houses that use front companies outside Iran, mainly in Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates, to make or receive payments for sanctioned persons10 . FinCEN’s advisory of the same month adds the consequence: by using front-company accounts outside Iran to both receive and remit payments, sanctioned Iranian entities may be able to transact through the international financial system without ever repatriating funds to Iran11 . The mechanics of the exchange-house side are on the exchange house and rahbar networks page.

FinCEN’s May 2026 alert on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps carries the pattern into digital assets. One of its red flags is a customer of a digital-asset service provider who appears to be using the provider’s liquidity to carry out large numbers of offsetting transactions12 .

What offsetting does and does not remove

Offsetting reduces payments; it does not remove them. Whatever is left after claims are set against each other has to be paid, or carried forward as a debt. In the A7 description the fiat leg still runs through correspondent banks and SWIFT, which is why FinCEN’s alert is addressed to banks and asks them to look at that leg. In the Iranian cases the residual moves through front-company accounts that FinCEN says it can identify in Bank Secrecy Act data. This is the practical difference from gold and commodity barter, where the settlement asset itself leaves the banking system, and from plain third-country accounts, where the payment is real and only the party is disguised. In most of the documented cases netting is combined with those methods, not used in place of them.

How it is caught

  • Reconcile the trade. Goods shipped should correspond to money received from, or sent to, the contracting party. A shipment paid for by a company with no stated role, or by a domestic transfer in the buyer’s own country, is a mismatch. The mirror statistics approach does this at country level.
  • Look at the agent, not the buyer. FinCEN’s A7 alert lists money-laundering indicators for sub-agent transactions: unusually high volumes shortly after a company is formed, goods descriptions that do not fit the supplier’s profile, unusual routing through apparent shell companies, and falsified or AI-altered invoices.
  • Use the designations. Treasury named the clearing platforms and the individual, and FinCEN has proposed a special measure aimed at A7’s sub-agents. Screening these names is the cheapest control, though the alert describes the sub-agents as numbering in the hundreds.
  • Watch the digital leg. The IRGC alert’s offsetting flag is aimed at customers of digital-asset service providers who run large numbers of offsetting transactions and may have exposure to Iranian counterparts.

What the record does not show

  • The word. None of the US documents collected here uses “netting”. The mechanism is called offsetting, mutual settlement, clearing or a ledger, and the match between these and a financial netting arrangement is the author’s reading. UK documents from the National Crime Agency, OFSI and OTSI that were searched did not describe it, and no EU or Venezuela-related document was found that does.
  • Size. None of the sources says how much trade is settled this way. FinCEN’s A7 figures concern the volume the network processed, not how much was offset.
  • Allegations and findings. The clearing-platform and A7 descriptions are Treasury and FinCEN findings in designation and advisory documents. The Treasury release calls the Russian banks “reportedly” participants, which is not a finding.
  • Mechanics. The documents do not explain how residual balances between the platforms are cleared, or how the Russian and Chinese platforms agree exchange rates and prices.
  • Current status. Whether the platforms named in January 2025 still operate under the same arrangements is not shown in these documents.

What the sources say

Each numbered claim above, with the words of the document it rests on and — for the Panel of Experts reports — the paragraph it comes from. Quotes are checked against the source text at build time.

  1. “A variation of Black Market Peso Exchange is called offsetting or compensation, whereby OCGs or PMLs dispose of illicit cash by cooperating with OCGs or PMLs looking for cash.”

    Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments. Financial Action Task Force and Egmont Group, 2020.

  2. “this risk is revisited here to help educate and inform those who may find they are being told to engage with an entirely unknown and unrelated third-party in settling the invoice”

    Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments. Financial Action Task Force and Egmont Group, 2020.

  3. “Russia and China have been working to set up regional clearing platforms (RCPs) in both Russia and China to act as counterparties to allow for cross-border payments for sensitive goods”

    Treasury Disrupts Russia's Sanctions Evasion Schemes. US Department of the Treasury, 2025.

  4. “The RCPs facilitate non-cash mutual settlement for payments for so-called sanctioned goods.”

    Treasury Disrupts Russia's Sanctions Evasion Schemes. US Department of the Treasury, 2025.

  5. “The purchase of Keremet Bank was intended to create a sanctions evasion hub for Russia to pay for imports and receive payment for exports.”

    Treasury Disrupts Russia's Sanctions Evasion Schemes. US Department of the Treasury, 2025.

  6. “A7 Network-controlled settlement mechanisms, including bills of exchange or promissory notes (referred to as veksels in Russian), that record value inside the network”

    FinCEN Alert on the A7 Network (FIN-2026-Alert007). U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026.

  7. “enabling the A7 Network to transmit value through the international financial system without a Russian or other sanctioned customer appearing in the payment chain”

    FinCEN Alert on the A7 Network (FIN-2026-Alert007). U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026.

  8. “The token serves as an internal accounting method for the network, moving across internal addresses to maintain a balanced ledger”

    FinCEN Alert on the A7 Network (FIN-2026-Alert007). U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026.

  9. “the tokens are used for transfers within Russia that represent foreign payments”

    FinCEN Alert on the A7 Network (FIN-2026-Alert007). U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026.

  10. “The system operates as a parallel banking system in which settlements are brokered through Iran-based exchange houses that use front companies outside of Iran”

    Treasury Sanctions Iranian Network Laundering Billions for Regime Through Shadow Banking Scheme. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025.

  11. “sanctioned Iranian entities may be able to conduct transactions through the international financial system without ever repatriating funds to Iran”

    FinCEN Advisory on the Iranian Regime’s Illicit Oil Smuggling Activities, Shadow Banking Networks, and Weapons Procurement Efforts. U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2025.

  12. “appears to be using liquidity provided by the DASP to execute large numbers of offsetting transactions”

    FinCEN Alert on the Use of Front Companies, Financial Facilitators, and Digital Asset Infrastructure by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Evade Sanctions and Launder Proceeds. U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026.

Red-flag indicators

4 listed
01 Payments for sensitive goods go through a clearing platform that acts as the counterparty and settles on a non-cash basis. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2024
“The RCPs facilitate non-cash mutual settlement for payments for so-called sanctioned goods”

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury press release jy2785, regional clearing platforms and Keremet Bank (2024). Read the source document

02 A customer is told to settle an invoice with an unknown and unrelated third party. FATF and Egmont Group, 2020
“being told to engage with an entirely unknown and unrelated third-party in settling the invoice”

FATF and Egmont Group, Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments (2020). Read the source document

03 A digital-asset service provider supplies liquidity for large numbers of offsetting transactions. FinCEN, 2026
“appears to be using liquidity provided by the DASP to execute large numbers of offsetting transactions”

FinCEN, FinCEN Alert on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (May 2026) (2026). Read the source document

04 A network records value internally through bills of exchange or promissory notes, so no sanctioned customer appears in the payment chain. FinCEN, 2026
“settlement mechanisms, including bills of exchange or promissory notes (referred to as veksels in Russian), that record value inside the network”

FinCEN, FinCEN Alert FIN-2026-Alert007 (1 October 2026), Red Flag Indicators for A7 Activity (2026). Read the source document

Each indicator above is quoted or paraphrased from the advisory or typology report named beside it. Expand a row for the citation. These are recognition aids drawn from published guidance, not a compliance checklist.

How it is detected

The check is reconciliation. Goods that move should be matched by a payment from, or to, the party named in the contract; where settlement runs through an intermediary, the paying party has no role in the trade and the payment instruction is detached from the invoice. Banks see only the fiat leg, so the useful questions are about that leg: a recently formed third-country company paying for goods it does not appear to deal in, unusually high volumes soon after incorporation, and invoices that do not fit the supplier's business. Authorities also work from the other end, designating the platforms and agents and publishing their names so that screening can catch them.

Related techniques

Where this appears

Sanctions programmes

  • Russia sanctions — Measures imposed from 2014 and greatly expanded from 2022, combining designations, sectoral restrictions, export controls and a price cap on seaborne oil.
  • Iran sanctions — A layered set of US, EU and UN measures dating from 1979 and substantially rebuilt after 2018, covering energy, finance, shipping, and proliferation-related procurement.

Jurisdictions in the published record

  • Kyrgyzstan — A Eurasian Economic Union member whose onward machinery exports to Russia rose roughly thirtyfold between 2021 and 2023, alongside a roughly ninefold rise in German and US shipments into the country over the same period.
  • Hong Kong — A major financial and trading centre whose company formation regime, banking sector and re-export role place it in a large share of published corporate concealment cases.
  • China — A very large manufacturing exporter, named as a transshipment point in US export-control alerts on Russia and described in Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team reporting as the place North Korea's stolen cryptocurrency is cashed out.
  • United Arab Emirates — A major re-export hub and financial centre that appears in enforcement records across almost every technique on this site, principally because of the volume of trade that passes through it.

Terms used on this page

  • Trade-based money laundering — Moving value by misrepresenting the price, quantity or quality of goods in international trade, so that the transfer appears as ordinary commerce.
  • Informal value transfer system — Any arrangement that transfers value between parties without moving funds through the regulated banking system, settling obligations by netting or in kind.
  • Correspondent banking — An arrangement in which one bank holds an account for another and provides payment and other services on its behalf, usually to give it access to a foreign currency.
  • Front company — A company that carries on some real business but exists substantially to conceal the involvement of another party in its transactions.
  • Shadow banking (FinCEN usage) — FinCEN's term for the network of front companies, banks and money exchangers Iran uses to bypass sanctions and banking controls and move funds globally.
  • Layering — Inserting successive intermediate parties, transactions or jurisdictions between an asset and its owner so that the connection cannot be established from any single record.

Further reading and sources

  1. Trade-Based Money Laundering: Trends and Developments. Financial Action Task Force and Egmont Group, 2020.
  2. Treasury Disrupts Russia's Sanctions Evasion Schemes. US Department of the Treasury, 2025. Press release jy2785, 15 January 2025.
  3. FinCEN Alert on the A7 Network (FIN-2026-Alert007). U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026. 1 October 2026; red flag indicators pp. 6-8.
  4. Treasury Sanctions Iranian Network Laundering Billions for Regime Through Shadow Banking Scheme. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025. Press release sb0159, 6 June 2025.
  5. FinCEN Advisory on the Iranian Regime’s Illicit Oil Smuggling Activities, Shadow Banking Networks, and Weapons Procurement Efforts. U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2025. FIN-2025-A002, 6 June 2025.
  6. FinCEN Alert on the Use of Front Companies, Financial Facilitators, and Digital Asset Infrastructure by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to Evade Sanctions and Launder Proceeds. U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026. FIN-2026-Alert002, 11 May 2026.