<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>Sanctions Evasion Reference — Enforcement cases</title><description>Enforcement cases written up on this site, newest review first. The date on each item is the page&apos;s review date.</description><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/</link><language>en</language><item><title>Crédit Agricole: Sudan through the Swiss subsidiary</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/credit-agricole-cib-2015/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/credit-agricole-cib-2015/</guid><description>Crédit Agricole CIB paid OFAC $329.6 million in 2015 for 4,297 violations, almost all Sudanese. Its Swiss subsidiary and predecessors processed 4,024 of the 4,055 Sudan transfers, omitting sanctioned parties from SWIFT messages.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>Credit Suisse: standard procedures for cover payments</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/credit-suisse-2009/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/credit-suisse-2009/</guid><description>Credit Suisse paid $536 million in 2009 in a global settlement. OFAC found the bank had standard procedures for cover payments and altered messages that hid sanctioned parties across 5,138 transfers.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>ExxonMobil: eight documents signed with Igor Sechin</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/exxonmobil-sechin-2017/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/exxonmobil-sechin-2017/</guid><description>ExxonMobil is the company OFAC fined $2 million in 2017 for signing eight oil and gas documents with Rosneft&apos;s chief, Igor Sechin, after his designation. A federal court vacated the penalty in 2019.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category></item><item><title>HSBC: Burma and Sudan, not just Iran</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/hsbc-2012/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/hsbc-2012/</guid><description>HSBC paid OFAC $375 million in 2012. The sanctions case covered 2,335 transfers worth about $430 million, with Burma the largest share, and Treasury said its London head office and Dubai branch altered SWIFT messages.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>ING: 20,452 Cuba transactions, run from the branches</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/ing-bank-2012/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/ing-bank-2012/</guid><description>ING Bank paid OFAC $619 million in 2012 over mostly Cuban dollar transactions. Treasury said senior managers told staff in Curaçao to omit Cuba from payment messages, and a French office authorised false endorsement stamps.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>Maersk Line, Limited: 4,714 shipments booked by the group</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/maersk-line-limited-2010/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/maersk-line-limited-2010/</guid><description>Maersk Line, Limited, a US subsidiary, paid OFAC $3.1 million in 2010 for shipping services on 4,714 cargoes to or from Sudan and Iran, carried on its vessels but booked through its non-US parent.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category></item><item><title>Balli Aviation: three airliners for Mahan Air</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/balli-aviation-mahan-air-2010/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/balli-aviation-mahan-air-2010/</guid><description>Balli Aviation is the London company that paid $15 million with Balli Group in 2010, and pleaded guilty, after exporting three commercial airliners from the United States to Iran&apos;s Mahan Airlines and attempting three more.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>aviation-parts-procurement</category></item><item><title>Bank of Moscow: Bank Melli Iran as &apos;BMI CJSC&apos;</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/bank-of-moscow-2014/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/bank-of-moscow-2014/</guid><description>Bank of Moscow is the Russian bank that paid OFAC $9.5 million in 2014 for 69 dollar transfers worth $41 million for a designated Iranian bank&apos;s Moscow subsidiary, named by abbreviation so US banks processed them without review.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>Berkshire Hathaway: a Turkish subsidiary hid Iran sales</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/berkshire-hathaway-iscar-turkey-2020/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/berkshire-hathaway-iscar-turkey-2020/</guid><description>Berkshire Hathaway paid OFAC $4.1 million in 2020 after its Turkish cutting-tool subsidiary sold to Iran through two Turkish distributors, using private email accounts, false names and false invoices to hide it from the group.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>Barclays: memos warned of a &apos;work around&apos;</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/barclays-2010/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/barclays-2010/</guid><description>Barclays paid OFAC $176 million in 2010. The settlement agreement quotes internal memos from 2001 and 2004 warning that its payment procedures were a work around of US sanctions, and cover payments a way of bypassing them.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>CSE TransTel: a promise to its bank, broken in two months</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/cse-global-transtel-2017/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/cse-global-transtel-2017/</guid><description>Singapore&apos;s CSE TransTel paid OFAC $12 million in 2017. Two months after promising its bank not to route Iran business through it, it sent 104 dollar transfers for Iranian energy projects that cleared through US banks.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>Lloyds TSB: a policy of deleting sanctioned names</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/lloyds-tsb-2009/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/lloyds-tsb-2009/</guid><description>Lloyds TSB paid $217 million in 2009 although OFAC counted only $37 million in transfers. OFAC says it had a policy of intentionally manipulating and deleting information about sanctioned parties in wire instructions.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>Standard Chartered 2012: Sudan largest, all self-disclosed</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/standard-chartered-2012/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/standard-chartered-2012/</guid><description>Standard Chartered paid OFAC $132 million in 2012 over 919 wire transfers across five programmes. Sudan carried 52 per cent of the base penalty, and the bank had voluntarily self-disclosed all of it.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>Rice Lake Weighing Systems: one email, no translation</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/rice-lake-weighing-iran-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/rice-lake-weighing-iran-2026/</guid><description>A Wisconsin manufacturer paid OFAC $60,764 in 2026 after its Italian subsidiary, told once by email to stop dealing with Iran, kept selling through a UAE distributor whose customer&apos;s emails were signed from Iran.</description><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>acquisition-integration-gaps</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category></item><item><title>Murad: hidden from the acquirer, before and after the deal</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/murad-unilever-iran-2023/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/murad-unilever-iran-2023/</guid><description>A cosmetics company and a former executive paid OFAC $3.5 million combined in 2023 for an eight-year Iran export conspiracy concealed from Unilever during its 2015 acquisition and continued for over two years afterward despite direct instructions to stop.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category></item><item><title>Nasdaq: an Iranian bank on the member list nobody read sanctions into</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/nasdaq-armenia-bank-mellat-2023/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/nasdaq-armenia-bank-mellat-2023/</guid><description>Nasdaq paid OFAC $4 million in 2023: its Armenian exchange subsidiary, inherited via a 2008 acquisition, kept an Iranian-owned bank&apos;s market access running for two years after staff were twice told who the member was.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>acquisition-integration-gaps</category></item><item><title>State Street: redated invoices inside an acquisition</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/state-street-charles-river-2024/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/state-street-charles-river-2024/</guid><description>State Street paid OFAC $7.5 million in 2024 after its acquired subsidiary kept redating invoices to dodge Russia&apos;s debt-maturity sanctions for two years post-acquisition, while State Street&apos;s own screening alerts on the same payments were manually dismissed.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>acquisition-integration-gaps</category><category>untested-screening-controls</category></item><item><title>Wells Fargo: software built to host what the bank wouldn&apos;t process</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/wells-fargo-wachovia-eximbills-2023/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/wells-fargo-wachovia-eximbills-2023/</guid><description>Wells Fargo paid OFAC $30 million in 2023 after inheriting a Wachovia platform specially engineered so a European bank could process trade-finance deals with Iran, Sudan and Syria on infrastructure the US bank still controlled.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>professional-enablers</category><category>untested-screening-controls</category></item><item><title>Bukit Muria Jaya: cigarette paper for North Korea, paid in dollars</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/bukit-muria-jaya-dprk-2021/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/bukit-muria-jaya-dprk-2021/</guid><description>An Indonesian paper manufacturer paid OFAC $1.0 million in 2021 after selling cigarette paper to North Korea, swapping DPRK names for intermediaries on its paperwork and taking payment through a dollar account that cleared in the US.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>Danfoss: paid through a US bank&apos;s UAE branch</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/danfoss-uae-us-branch-account-2022/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/danfoss-uae-us-branch-account-2022/</guid><description>Danish manufacturer Danfoss paid OFAC $4.4 million in 2022 after its UAE subsidiary told customers in Iran, Syria and Sudan to pay into a US bank&apos;s UAE branch, using money exchangers as third-party payers.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>Fracht: a charter on a blocked Mahan Air aircraft</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/fracht-emtrasur-mahan-air-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/fracht-emtrasur-mahan-air-2025/</guid><description>A Houston freight forwarder paid OFAC $1.6 million in 2025 after two executives skipped screening to charter a Venezuelan state airline&apos;s aircraft, which was still blocked as Mahan Air property under its old Iranian tail number.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>professional-enablers</category></item><item><title>UniCredit: a written guide to payments the US would not see</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/unicredit-2019/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/unicredit-2019/</guid><description>Three UniCredit banks paid OFAC $611 million in 2019 across 2,897 apparent violations, including a formal guide telling staff how to format dollar payments so US intermediaries could not detect sanctioned parties.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>Unicat: Iran written as &quot;I&quot; in the emails</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/unicat-catalysts-iran-venezuela-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/unicat-catalysts-iran-venezuela-2025/</guid><description>A Texas catalyst company paid OFAC $3.9 million in 2025 after its former CEO directed sales to Iran through a UAE distributor, a Dutch affiliate and a China office. New owners found it on a site visit.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>UBAF: Syrian transfers booked inside, mirrored in dollars</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/ubaf-syria-internal-transfers-2021/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/ubaf-syria-internal-transfers-2021/</guid><description>A French trade-finance bank settled with OFAC in 2021 for processing 127 transactions worth $2.1 billion for Syrian parties by booking internal transfers and then clearing near-identical dollar payments for other clients through a US bank.</description><pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>IPI Partners: a legal opinion built on half the facts</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/ipi-partners-kerimov-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/ipi-partners-kerimov-2025/</guid><description>A Chicago private equity firm paid OFAC $11.5 million in 2025 for continuing to deal with the same Kerimov trust structure GVA Capital used, after its own outside counsel cleared the account on incomplete information.</description><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category><category>nominee-directors</category><category>shell-company-layering</category></item><item><title>Interactive Brokers: six failures across one platform</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/interactive-brokers-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/interactive-brokers-2025/</guid><description>A global online broker paid OFAC $11.8 million in 2025 after geo-blocking gaps, a mis-dispositioned SDN alert, an unscreened liquidation engine and an ownership-lookup delay let six different sanctions programs be breached.</description><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>untested-screening-controls</category><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category></item><item><title>Key Holding: found during due diligence for the next sale</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/key-holding-colombia-cuba-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/key-holding-colombia-cuba-2025/</guid><description>A Delaware logistics company paid OFAC $608,825 in 2025 after its Colombian subsidiary ran 36 freight shipments to Cuba, discovered only when the parent was vetting the subsidiary for resale to another buyer.</description><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>acquisition-integration-gaps</category></item><item><title>TradeStation: two layers of geo-blocking, both down</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/tradestation-securities-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/tradestation-securities-2026/</guid><description>A Florida brokerage paid OFAC $1.1 million in 2026 after a platform rebuild, an unreset setting and a discontinued test tool let its two-layer geo-blocking system fail for nearly a year without anyone noticing.</description><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>untested-screening-controls</category></item><item><title>Apple Distribution International: an ownership change nobody caught</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/apple-distribution-international-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/apple-distribution-international-2026/</guid><description>Apple&apos;s Irish payments subsidiary paid OFSI £390,000 in 2026, the first case under OFSI&apos;s new settlement framework, after paying a Russian app developer that had quietly changed hands to a newly designated owner.</description><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category></item><item><title>Herbert Smith Freehills Moscow: six payments in a rushed closure</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/hsf-moscow-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/hsf-moscow-2025/</guid><description>A Magic Circle law firm&apos;s Russian office paid OFSI £465,000 in 2025 after making six payments to designated banks while closing down in a week, including one to a subsidiary its own staff wrongly cleared.</description><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category></item><item><title>Deutsche Bank London: a screening list with no ownership data</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/deutsche-bank-london-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/deutsche-bank-london-2026/</guid><description>Deutsche Bank&apos;s London branch paid £635,618.75 in two payments to Okko, a Russian streaming company sold by Sberbank to an entity designated weeks later. Screening lists carried no ownership data. OFSI settled at £165,000.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category></item><item><title>Markom Management: an overpayment returned to a designated person</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/markom-management-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/markom-management-2025/</guid><description>A UK fiduciary services firm instructed a £416,590.92 refund to a designated person after an overpayment, in haste and without legal advice. OFSI penalised it £300,000 in 2025, reduced from a proposed £400,000.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>professional-enablers</category></item><item><title>Sabre: a $200 test payment through a second bank</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/sabre-global-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/sabre-global-2026/</guid><description>A UK travel-technology company kept serving and invoicing Ural Airlines after its designation, then tested whether payments would clear through its US bank after its UK bank froze them. OFSI penalised it £1,000,920.59.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>Standard Chartered UK: 70 loans to a Sberbank subsidiary</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/standard-chartered-uk-2020/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/standard-chartered-uk-2020/</guid><description>OFSI penalised Standard Chartered £20.47m in 2020 over loans to Denizbank, a Turkish bank almost wholly owned by Sberbank, that did not qualify for the EU-nexus exemption. Ministerial review cut the earlier £31.5m.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>Rotterdam: components invoiced to the Maldives</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/rotterdam-electronics-maldives-2023/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/rotterdam-electronics-maldives-2023/</guid><description>A Dutch court fined an electronics company €200,000 and jailed its Russian-born director for 18 months in 2023 over integrated circuits sent to Russia, on eight invoices naming a Maldives transhipment firm as the customer.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>dual-use-re-export</category></item><item><title>Aiotec: a polypropylene plant declared for Türkiye, delivered to Iran</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/aiotec-iran-polypropylene-plant/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/aiotec-iran-polypropylene-plant/</guid><description>A German company paid OFAC $14.55m in 2024 after buying a decommissioned Australian plant through a US reseller and shipping it to Iran, using three end-user certificates naming Türkiye and shipping documents that showed the UAE and Mersin.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>end-user-certificate-fraud</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category></item><item><title>SCG Plastics: Iranian resin with the origin &apos;Middle East&apos;</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/scg-plastics-iranian-hdpe/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/scg-plastics-iranian-hdpe/</guid><description>A Thai trading company paid OFAC $20m in 2024 after selling Iranian-made polyethylene for dollars, listing the country of origin as &apos;Middle East&apos; and the loading port as Jebel Ali, so that US correspondent banks processed $291m.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>trade-misinvoicing</category></item><item><title>Keystone Shipping: Russian bitumen via sham sales chains</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/keystone-shipping-estonia-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/keystone-shipping-estonia-2026/</guid><description>An Estonian court convicted a trading company and its board member in 2026 for buying Russian bitumen through a chain of sham sales and forged Kazakh and Uzbek export papers, and for buying from a state-owned Gazprom Neft subsidiary.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>cargo-origin-blending</category><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>A €62,000 car declared at €4,900</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/estonia-luxury-car-narva-2023/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/estonia-luxury-car-narva-2023/</guid><description>Estonian courts convicted two men of attempting to export a luxury car to Russia in 2023. The papers said €4,900 and &apos;unroadworthy&apos;. The purchase price was €59,571 and the valuation €62,000, above the €50,000 ban threshold.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>trade-misinvoicing</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category></item><item><title>Estonia: a media network kept running after it &apos;closed&apos;</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/estonia-media-representation-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/estonia-media-representation-2025/</guid><description>An Estonian court convicted a resident in 2025 of breaching EU sanctions by continuing a designated Russian media head&apos;s Estonian operation through a renamed company, a new brand, a nonprofit and Russian funding after its office formally closed.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>Lübeck: 16,000 deliveries to Russian defence companies alleged</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/luebeck-export-network-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/luebeck-export-network-2026/</guid><description>German federal prosecutors arrested five people in February 2026 on suspicion of running a criminal organisation that exported goods to Russia through a Lübeck trading company, a shell company and fictitious customers, including to 24 listed defence firms.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>Netherlands: lab equipment exported through a web of firms</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/netherlands-lab-equipment-network-2024/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/netherlands-lab-equipment-network-2024/</guid><description>Five countries&apos; authorities arrested three people in January 2024 over technological and laboratory equipment with military uses exported to Russia through a web of enterprises around a Dutch trading company, now run from Russia.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>front-companies</category><category>dual-use-re-export</category></item><item><title>Exodus: support staff who suggested a VPN</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/exodus-wallet-iran-vpn-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/exodus-wallet-iran-vpn-2025/</guid><description>A US crypto-wallet company paid OFAC $3.1m in 2025 for 254 customer-support contacts with users in Iran, on 12 of which staff who knew the exchange partner was blocking Iran recommended VPNs to hide the users&apos; location.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>crypto-rails</category></item><item><title>Gracetown: payments for a designated oligarch&apos;s former company</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/gracetown-deripaska-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/gracetown-deripaska-2025/</guid><description>OFAC fined a New York property manager $7.1m in 2025 for taking 24 payments on behalf of a company owned by Oleg Deripaska after his designation, and for not reporting the blocked debt for over 45 months.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>Haas: unlock codes for machines owned by blocked Russian entities</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/haas-automation-russia-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/haas-automation-russia-2025/</guid><description>A California machine-tool maker paid OFAC $1.04m in 2025 after its Russian distributor sold a CNC machine and parts to eight blocked or majority-owned customers and obtained unlock codes that kept their machines running.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>dual-use-re-export</category><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category></item><item><title>Harman: &apos;North Dubai&apos; as a code for Iran</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/harman-uae-distributor-iran-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/harman-uae-distributor-iran-2025/</guid><description>A US audio company paid OFAC $1.45m in 2025 after 13 sales employees knew its UAE distributor was reselling to Iran and referred to it in emails as &apos;the northern region&apos;, &apos;North Dubai&apos; and &apos;up north&apos;.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>dual-use-re-export</category></item><item><title>Mondo TV: paying a North Korean studio through a US company</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/mondo-tv-north-korea-2024/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/mondo-tv-north-korea-2024/</guid><description>An Italian animation company paid OFAC $538,000 in 2024 after making 18 payments to a North Korean government studio through two Chinese firms and a US company&apos;s American bank accounts, on the studio&apos;s invoices.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>ShapeShift: 17,183 exchanges with users in sanctioned countries</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/shapeshift-exchange-2025/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/shapeshift-exchange-2025/</guid><description>A Swiss-incorporated, Denver-run crypto exchange paid OFAC $750,000 in 2025 for exchanging $12.6m of digital assets with users in Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria, having collected IP addresses but never screened them.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>crypto-rails</category></item><item><title>SkyGeek: a $669 refund to a newly designated UAE supplier</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/skygeek-refunds-to-sdns-2024/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/skygeek-refunds-to-sdns-2024/</guid><description>A New York aviation-parts seller paid OFAC $22,172 in 2024 for two attempted refunds and four shipments to two UAE aircraft-parts firms designated for Russian sectors, after its screening did not re-run on customers already approved.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>aviation-parts-procurement</category></item><item><title>Vietnam Beverage: alcohol to North Korea, paid by 17 firms</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/vietnam-beverage-north-korea-2024/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/vietnam-beverage-north-korea-2024/</guid><description>A Vietnamese drinks holding company paid OFAC $860,000 in 2024 after its subsidiaries invoiced North Korean buyers in dollars and were paid by 15 third-party companies in Hong Kong, China and Turkey, plus two more in Singapore and the Seychelles.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category></item><item><title>C.H. Robinson: five subsidiaries not yet on the parent&apos;s screening</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/ch-robinson-subsidiaries-2024/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/ch-robinson-subsidiaries-2024/</guid><description>A Minnesota logistics company paid OFAC $257,690 in 2024 after five acquired foreign subsidiaries brokered or moved 82 shipments to or from Iran, or of Iranian or Cuban goods, on systems the parent had not yet connected.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>professional-enablers</category><category>acquisition-integration-gaps</category></item><item><title>EFG: blocked clients behind an omnibus account</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/efg-omnibus-accounts-2024/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/efg-omnibus-accounts-2024/</guid><description>A Swiss private bank paid OFAC $3.7m in 2024 after its subsidiaries processed 873 securities transactions through omnibus accounts at US custodians for Cuban residents and two designated clients, without telling the US firms who was behind the account.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>front-companies</category><category>omnibus-securities-accounts</category></item><item><title>IMG Academy: tuition paid by third parties for two designated parents</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/img-academy-tuition-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/img-academy-tuition-2026/</guid><description>A Florida sports academy paid OFAC $1.72m in 2026 after enrolling the children of two individuals designated for cartel ties over five years, with tuition wired by non-designated third parties, mostly in Mexico.</description><pubDate>Sun, 20 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>Citibank London: 970 payments, one missed prefix</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/cbna-london-2026/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/cbna-london-2026/</guid><description>Citibank&apos;s London branch processed 970 payments worth £19.7m in breach of Russia sanctions in 2026, including £4.3m within 24 hours of a designation, after screening missed a Russian corporate prefix and a 50 per cent ownership test.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category></item><item><title>Commerzbank: a manual payment queue for Iranian counterparties</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/commerzbank-2015/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/commerzbank-2015/</guid><description>Commerzbank settled 1,596 apparent violations in 2015. Employees deleted references to Iranian banks, substituted Commerzbank&apos;s own name as originator, and built a manual queue to keep those payments out of automated processing.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>Epsilon Electronics: selling to a distributor that sold to Iran</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/epsilon-electronics-iran/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/epsilon-electronics-iran/</guid><description>A California car audio maker settled at $1,500,000 in 2018 after litigation, over 39 invoices to a UAE distributor it knew or had reason to know sent most or all of its products to Iran.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>front-companies</category><category>dual-use-re-export</category></item><item><title>BNP Paribas: the $963m correspondent banking settlement</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/bnp-paribas-2014/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/bnp-paribas-2014/</guid><description>BNP Paribas settled 3,897 apparent violations in 2014 over a systematic practice, across multiple branches and business lines, of removing sanctioned parties from dollar payment messages sent to US banks.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category></item><item><title>Family International Realty: transferred to relatives</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/family-international-realty/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/family-international-realty/</guid><description>A Miami realtor and its owner paid $1,076,923 in 2025 after moving nominal ownership of two sanctioned oligarchs&apos; condominiums to their non-designated family members and to shell companies those relatives owned.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category><category>nominee-directors</category><category>shell-company-layering</category><category>professional-enablers</category></item><item><title>Fokker Services: 1,153 shipments of aircraft parts to Iran and Sudan</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/fokker-services-aircraft-parts/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/fokker-services-aircraft-parts/</guid><description>A Dutch aerospace services company settled potential liability of $50,922,208 in 2014 after five years of routing US-origin aircraft spare parts to Iranian and Sudanese customers.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>aviation-parts-procurement</category><category>dual-use-re-export</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category></item><item><title>Halkbank, Zarrab and Atilla: oil revenue disguised as food</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/halkbank-zarrab-atilla/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/halkbank-zarrab-atilla/</guid><description>A Turkish banker was convicted in 2018 of using a state-owned bank to release Iranian oil revenue through gold and currency, with false documents making the transactions appear to involve food.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>gold-and-commodity-barter</category><category>hs-code-misclassification</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>front-companies</category><category>trade-misinvoicing</category></item><item><title>Flighttime: a false end-user certificate</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/flighttime-enterprises-aviation/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/flighttime-enterprises-aviation/</guid><description>An Ohio aircraft parts supplier and three employees were charged in 2025 over shipments to Russian end users, using mislabelled shipments, false certifications and intermediary countries.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>aviation-parts-procurement</category><category>end-user-certificate-fraud</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>Herbert Smith Freehills Moscow: six payments while closing the office</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/hsf-moscow-2024/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/hsf-moscow-2024/</guid><description>A law firm&apos;s Moscow office paid six designated Russian banks £3,932,392.10 while closing its office after the 2022 invasion, then received a 50 per cent penalty reduction for its own group&apos;s disclosure to OFSI.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>professional-enablers</category></item><item><title>ZTE: front companies and an internal plan to keep supplying Iran</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/zte-2017/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/zte-2017/</guid><description>ZTE paid OFAC $100,871,266 in 2017 for 251 apparent violations, concurrently with settlements with the Bureau of Industry and Security and a plea agreement with the Department of Justice.</description><pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>front-companies</category><category>dual-use-re-export</category><category>end-user-certificate-fraud</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category></item><item><title>Adani Enterprises: 35 cargoes of LPG that were not Omani</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/adani-enterprises-lpg/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/adani-enterprises-lpg/</guid><description>Adani Enterprises settled at $275,000,000 in 2026 after buying LPG from a Dubai trader that was in fact Iranian. The vessels carrying it were spoofing and going dark throughout.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ais-manipulation</category><category>flag-hopping</category><category>cargo-origin-blending</category><category>front-companies</category><category>trade-misinvoicing</category></item><item><title>Binance: a matching engine with no jurisdiction in it</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/binance-2023/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/binance-2023/</guid><description>Binance settled 1,667,153 apparent violations in 2023. Its matching engine paired US users with users in sanctioned jurisdictions, and OFAC found senior management knew, and undermined its own controls.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>crypto-rails</category></item><item><title>British American Tobacco and the North Korea joint venture</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/british-american-tobacco-dprk/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/british-american-tobacco-dprk/</guid><description>BAT paid $508,612,492 in 2023 over a scheme in which tobacco was exported to North Korea and paid for through the US financial system using a network of intermediary companies.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>front-companies</category><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>shell-company-layering</category></item><item><title>Bittrex: onboarding data collected and not screened</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/bittrex-2022/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/bittrex-2022/</guid><description>Bittrex paid OFAC $24,280,829.20 in 2022 for 116,421 apparent violations, having collected customer IP and address data at onboarding without screening it for sanctioned jurisdictions.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>crypto-rails</category></item><item><title>Clearstream: one layer deeper in the custody chain</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/clearstream-2014/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/clearstream-2014/</guid><description>Clearstream settled at $151,902,000 in 2014. After OFAC raised its Iranian business, it moved securities entitlements so that the record owner changed and the Central Bank of Iran&apos;s beneficial interest did not.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>shell-company-layering</category><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>omnibus-securities-accounts</category></item><item><title>Essentra FZE: cigarette filters to North Korea through front companies</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/essentra-fze-dprk/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/essentra-fze-dprk/</guid><description>A UAE manufacturer paid $665,112 in 2020 after exporting cigarette filters to North Korea through front companies in China and elsewhere, having been asked in writing not to name the real destination.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>front-companies</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category><category>end-user-certificate-fraud</category></item><item><title>GVA Capital: managed through a nephew</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/gva-capital-kerimov/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/gva-capital-kerimov/</guid><description>A San Francisco venture firm was penalised $215,988,868 in 2025 for continuing to manage an investment for Suleiman Kerimov after his designation, working through a nephew it knew was his proxy.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>nominee-directors</category><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category><category>shell-company-layering</category><category>professional-enablers</category></item><item><title>MID-SHIP Group: payments connected to blocked vessels</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/mid-ship-group-irisl/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/mid-ship-group-irisl/</guid><description>A New York shipping agency paid $871,837 in 2019 over five funds transfers totalling about $472,861 that related to vessels identified on the SDN List after their operator was designated.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>ship-to-ship-transfers</category><category>flag-hopping</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>professional-enablers</category></item><item><title>Nordgas: re-exporting US pressure switches to Iran</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/nordgas-iran-reexport/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/nordgas-iran-reexport/</guid><description>An Italian boiler component maker paid $950,000 in 2021 after re-exporting 27 shipments of US-origin air pressure switches to Iranian customers, having been told expressly that Iranian end users were prohibited.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>dual-use-re-export</category><category>end-user-certificate-fraud</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>front-companies</category></item><item><title>Insurance against a risk the seller creates</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/hormuz-marine-insurance/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/hormuz-marine-insurance/</guid><description>Treasury designated two Iranian maritime insurance entities in 2026 for compelling vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz to buy IRGC-approved policies, accepting payment in digital assets.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>opaque-marine-insurance</category><category>crypto-rails</category><category>stablecoin-settlement</category></item><item><title>Blender, Tornado Cash and Sinbad: designating the mixers</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/mixer-designations/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/mixer-designations/</guid><description>Between 2022 and 2023 Treasury designated three virtual currency mixers used to launder proceeds of North Korean state-sponsored theft, turning a tracing problem into a list-matching one.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>mixers-and-chain-hopping</category><category>crypto-rails</category></item><item><title>Lumber Marine and Ice Pearl: the first price cap designations</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/price-cap-first-designations/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/price-cap-first-designations/</guid><description>Treasury designated two shipowners in October 2023 for carrying Russian crude bought above the cap while using US service providers, the first enforcement action under the price cap regime.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>price-cap-attestation-fraud</category><category>opaque-marine-insurance</category><category>cargo-origin-blending</category></item><item><title>Sojitz Hong Kong: dollar payments for Iranian-origin polyethylene</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/sojitz-hong-kong-iran-hdpe/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/sojitz-hong-kong-iran-hdpe/</guid><description>A Hong Kong trading company paid $5,228,298 in 2022 after making US dollar payments through US banks for approximately 64,000 tons of Iranian-origin polyethylene bought from a supplier in Thailand.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category><category>cargo-origin-blending</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>trade-misinvoicing</category></item><item><title>Swedbank Latvia: a client banking from Crimea</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/swedbank-latvia-crimea/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/swedbank-latvia-crimea/</guid><description>Swedbank Latvia paid $3,430,900 in 2023 for 386 apparent violations, after a shipping client sent payments through its e-banking platform from an IP address in Crimea via US correspondent banks.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>shell-company-layering</category></item><item><title>Toll Holdings: a freight forwarder&apos;s 2,958 payments</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/toll-holdings-freight-forwarding/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/toll-holdings-freight-forwarding/</guid><description>An Australian logistics company paid $6,131,855 in 2022 over 2,958 payments through the US financial system connected to shipments to, from or through North Korea, Iran and Syria.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>professional-enablers</category><category>third-country-transshipment</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>phantom-shipments</category><category>acquisition-integration-gaps</category></item><item><title>TGR Group: cash in one city, USDT in another</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/tgr-group-usdt/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/tgr-group-usdt/</guid><description>Treasury designated a network in 2024 that moved value for Russian elites by pairing bulk cash handovers against transfers of dollar-referenced stablecoins, settling the two against each other.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>stablecoin-settlement</category><category>hawala-and-informal-value-transfer</category><category>crypto-rails</category><category>professional-enablers</category><category>trade-misinvoicing</category></item><item><title>Standard Chartered: 9,335 payments from accounts in Dubai</title><link>https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/standard-chartered-2019/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/standard-chartered-2019/</guid><description>Standard Chartered settled with OFAC for $657,040,033 across two matters in 2019. The larger concerned Iran-related accounts at its Dubai branches, used by customers physically located in Iran.</description><pubDate>Thu, 20 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>third-country-bank-accounts</category><category>front-companies</category><category>correspondent-banking-abuse</category><category>ownership-threshold-structuring</category></item></channel></rss>