Sanctions Evasion Reference

A7: the Russian payment network Treasury says Iran used too

Treasury designated the Russia-linked A7 payment network as a transnational criminal organisation on 1 October 2026, and FinCEN proposed barring US financial institutions from transfers involving A7's foreign 'sub-agent' companies.

period

2024–2026

outcome

Designation

parties

A7 LLC; Ilan Shor; Promsvyazbank; Old Vector LLC; Garantex; Grinex

programmes

Russian Federation, Islamic Republic of Iran

reviewed

2026-11-08

Cite this page
APA 7
Sanctions Evasion Reference. (2026, November 8). A7: the Russian payment network Treasury says Iran used too. https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/a7-network-2025-2026/
Chicago
Sanctions Evasion Reference. “A7: the Russian payment network Treasury says Iran used too.” Last reviewed November 8, 2026. https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/a7-network-2025-2026/.
BibTeX
@misc{ser-cases-a7-network-2025-2026,
  author = {{Sanctions Evasion Reference}},
  title  = {A7: the Russian payment network Treasury says Iran used too},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Last reviewed 2026-11-08},
  url    = {https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/a7-network-2025-2026/}
}

The date is when this page was last reviewed, not when it was first published.

The US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) describes A7 as a sanctions evasion and money laundering service with ties to Russia, used by a wide range of illicit actors including Iran and its proxies. On 1 October 2026 Treasury acted against it three ways at once: a sanctions designation, a proposed rule and an alert to banks, all presented as part of its Iran campaign, Operation Economic Outcast. This page reports what those documents say. They are agency findings and a proposal, not a court judgment.

How Treasury describes the network

  • Who built it. According to FinCEN’s proposed rule, A7 was created by Ilan Shor, a Moldovan businessman sanctioned by the US, EU and UK whom Treasury calls a convicted fraudster, and by Promsvyazbank (PSB), Russia’s state-owned defence bank. Its core is three Russian companies, A7 LLC and two subsidiaries, jointly owned by Shor and PSB. FinCEN says that when A7 LLC was founded in 2024, PSB promoted the service as a way to “support Russian foreign trade participants and their trading partners amid anti-Russian sanctions pressure”.
  • The sub-agents. The working layer is a set of companies outside Russia that A7 controls, which FinCEN calls sub-agents. They receive and remit payments so that transfers look like ordinary trade. The first were set up in the Kyrgyz Republic; by June 2026, FinCEN says, A7 had created or acquired hundreds, with accounts at about 435 financial institutions in at least 83 countries. Treasury says A7 staff control the sub-agents’ websites and bank accounts, logging in through custom-built virtual private networks that hide their location.
  • The token. A7A5 is a ruble-backed stablecoin issued by Old Vector LLC, a Kyrgyz firm, and created for A7’s Russian clients. Treasury said in 2025 that after law enforcement action against the Garantex exchange in March 2025, Garantex moved its funds to its successor, Grinex, and customers who had lost funds were given the equivalent in A7A5.
  • Scale, two ways. A7’s own claim, as of January 2026, was more than 2,000 transactions a day and a cumulative 7.5 trillion rubles, about $91.5 billion; FinCEN notes that this would equal nearly 13 per cent of Russia’s 2025 foreign trade transactions. FinCEN’s own figure is narrower: its investigation found the sub-agents processed more than $17 billion between January 2025 and June 2026.
  • Named examples. The proposed rule describes several sub-agents in the United Arab Emirates. It says Power Sphere LLC-FZ, a Dubai electronics supplier that purportedly also trades energy, agricultural and consumer goods, processed $61 million in illicit funds tied to Russian trade-based money laundering and energy-sector procurement between September 2023 and July 2025. It says Hydrofusion Resources FZ-LLC processed $3.6 million in illicit funds in May and June 2025.
  • Iran. FinCEN says one sub-agent dealt directly with entities in Iran’s shadow fleet and, with a sister company, received nearly $140 million from entities involved in Iranian sanctions evasion between July 2023 and October 2025. Another sent about $1.6 million to a company linked to Iranian sanctions evasion and weapons procurement. Treasury also links A7 to Nobitex, an Iranian digital asset exchange OFAC designated in June 2026.

The actions

DateAuthorityAction
14 August 2025OFACRe-designated Garantex and designated Grinex, A7 LLC, its two subsidiaries and Old Vector under cyber-related sanctions
31 August 2026UK National Crime AgencyAlert on A7’s use for sanctions evasion involving Russia and Iran (as reported by Treasury)
1 October 2026OFACDesignated the A7 Network as a significant transnational criminal organisation, which also blocks sub-agents acting for it
1 October 2026FinCENAlert FIN-2026-Alert007 with red flags; suspicious activity reports should carry the key term FIN-2026-A7NETWORK
5 October 2026FinCENPublished the finding and proposed rule (91 FR 63208) under section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act; comments closed 4 November 2026

The proposed rule would treat any transaction involving a sub-agent as a class of transactions of primary money laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance, and would prohibit covered US financial institutions from certain transmittals of funds involving that class. Treasury presents this as reaching beyond Russia: the same sub-agents, it says, created pathways for Iran’s central bank, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran-backed groups to move funds through the international financial system.

What a bank is asked to look for

FinCEN’s alert sorts its red flags into three groups:

  • Sub-agents and shell companies: counterparties identified as A7 sub-agents, shell companies in the Kyrgyz Republic or other jurisdictions of concern, payments routed through several shells for no clear purpose, and newly formed companies with sudden high volumes.
  • Invoices: templates that differ from past standards, vague goods descriptions or implausible prices, an analog company stamp on an otherwise digital document, stray Cyrillic characters in English documents, and documents that look altered or generated by AI.
  • Digital assets: exposure to A7A5 or tokens derived from it, stablecoins sent to suspected sub-agents, and stablecoins used to pay for goods rarely bought that way, such as dual-use items or petroleum.

Several are in the red-flag library with FinCEN’s wording, filed under third-country bank accounts, trade misinvoicing and stablecoin settlement.

What the record does not show

  • Not yet a final rule. As of 8 November 2026 the comment period has closed and no final rule has been published. The prohibition on funds transfers is a proposal.
  • Whose numbers. The 7.5 trillion ruble figure is A7’s own claim. The $17 billion, $140 million and other amounts are FinCEN’s analysis of public and non-public information. None has been tested in court.
  • No charges here. None of the documents describes a criminal case against A7 itself.
  • The countries. The Kyrgyz Republic and the UAE appear because FinCEN places sub-agents there, and Hong Kong because the alert lists it, with Dubai and the Kyrgyz Republic, as hosting A7’s digital infrastructure. None of this is a finding against those governments.

Techniques this case demonstrates

Programmes and jurisdictions in this case

  • Russia sanctions — Measures imposed from 2014 and greatly expanded from 2022, combining designations, sectoral restrictions, export controls and a price cap on seaborne oil.
  • Iran sanctions — A layered set of US, EU and UN measures dating from 1979 and substantially rebuilt after 2018, covering energy, finance, shipping, and proliferation-related procurement.
  • Kyrgyzstan — A Eurasian Economic Union member whose onward machinery exports to Russia rose roughly thirtyfold between 2021 and 2023, alongside a roughly ninefold rise in German and US shipments into the country over the same period.
  • United Arab Emirates — A major re-export hub and financial centre that appears in enforcement records across almost every technique on this site, principally because of the volume of trade that passes through it.
  • Hong Kong — A major financial and trading centre whose company formation regime, banking sector and re-export role place it in a large share of published corporate concealment cases.

Enforcement documents and sources

  1. Proposal of Special Measure Prohibiting the Transmittal of Funds Regarding Transactions Involving the A7 Network's Sub-Agents. U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Federal Register, 2026. 91 FR 63208, 5 October 2026; I. Summary; II. Background; IV. Proposed Special Measure.
  2. FinCEN Alert on the A7 Network (FIN-2026-Alert007). U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026. 1 October 2026; red flag indicators pp. 6-8.
  3. Operation Economic Outcast Takes Unprecedented Action Against Sanctions Evasion Network Used by Iran. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026. Press release sb0644, 1 October 2026.
  4. Treasury Sanctions Cryptocurrency Exchange and Network Enabling Sanctions Evasion and Cyber Criminals. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025. Press release sb0225, 14 August 2025.

All enforcement cases