Sanctions Evasion Reference

Malaysia

Waters off Malaysia are named in US shipping guidance as a place where Iranian oil is transferred between ships, and Malaysia is a country of origin that Iranian cargo has been falsely papered as.

iso code

MY

role in the record

transshipment, origin

reviewed

2026-11-04

Cite this page
APA 7
Sanctions Evasion Reference. (2026, November 4). Malaysia. https://sanctionsevasion.org/reference/jurisdictions/my/
Chicago
Sanctions Evasion Reference. “Malaysia.” Last reviewed November 4, 2026. https://sanctionsevasion.org/reference/jurisdictions/my/.
BibTeX
@misc{ser-reference-jurisdictions-my,
  author = {{Sanctions Evasion Reference}},
  title  = {Malaysia},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Last reviewed 2026-11-04},
  url    = {https://sanctionsevasion.org/reference/jurisdictions/my/}
}

The date is when this page was last reviewed, not when it was first published.

This page describes why a jurisdiction appears in published enforcement records and typology reports. It is not an assessment of the country, its government or its businesses. Every jurisdiction listed here is a substantial legitimate economy, and appearing in this reference is usually a consequence of trade volume and connectivity rather than of weak rules.

Why it appears

Malaysia appears in the US record for two separate reasons, and neither concerns Malaysian law.

The waters. OFAC’s April 2025 shipping advisory on Iranian oil explains that sanctioned Iranian tankers transfer cargo to other vessels outside the territorial waters of a coastal state, and names Malaysia and Singapore as jurisdictions “known to have a high frequency of Iranian STS operations in adjacent waters”. It tells shipowners and charterers to investigate certificates of origin issued in such places, and tells port operators, agents and managers to look at vessels that show unusual AIS data when sailing in the outer port limits of Malaysia and Singapore. The advisory describes the transfers as taking place outside the territorial waters of a coastal state, which is why it speaks of adjacent waters.

The origin label. Iranian cargo has been papered as Malaysian. In August 2024 Treasury designated Malaysia-based Transmarine Navigation (M) Sdn. Bhd., saying it provided forged documents for the sanctioned vessel DAWN II that falsely showed the commodities aboard to be of Malaysian rather than Iranian origin, and that it was also involved in transporting Iranian commodities on another sanctioned vessel. In July 2025 Treasury said the Iranian oil carried by the vessel ATILA was disguised as Malaysian oil, and that another vessel loaded Iranian oil off the coast of Malaysia in August 2024 by ship-to-ship transfer. Both are close to what the cargo-origin blending page describes: the paperwork borrows a respectable origin.

What the record shows

  • Designations are findings by the US agency. Transmarine was designated under the counter-terrorism authority, as part of the network of a previously designated individual, and the release is the agency’s account, not a court’s.
  • A company is not a country. One Malaysia-based shipping agent was designated in the release. That says nothing about Malaysian shipping agents generally, most of which do ordinary business.
  • The advisory is guidance. The jurisdictions it names are described as places to apply closer scrutiny, not as places where activity is lawful or unlawful.

What the record does not show

These sources do not count Malaysian-linked transfers or measure how much oil they involve, and they say nothing about Malaysian government action. Reports from other organisations on the volume of transfers off Malaysia are not used here because they are not primary records. See also ship-to-ship transfers and the Iran programme.

Techniques that appear here

Sources

  1. Sanctions Advisory: Guidance for Shipping and Maritime Stakeholders on Detecting and Mitigating Iranian Oil Sanctions Evasion. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2025. 16 April 2025; ship-to-ship transfers, falsified documents, AIS manipulation.
  2. Treasury Adds Further Sanctions Targeting Houthi and Hizballah Trade Networks. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2024. 15 August 2024.
  3. Treasury Targets Diverse Networks Facilitating Iranian Oil Trade. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025. 3 July 2025.