Legitimate charities and religious institutions move money across borders every day, and financial regulators say they should be able to. This page is about a narrower thing: what the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) says the Iranian government does with some organisations of this kind. It is FinCEN’s finding about a state’s conduct. It is not a description of charity, of Shi’a communities, or of any organisation that is not named in an enforcement action.
What FinCEN says
On 15 October 2026 FinCEN issued Alert FIN-2026-Alert008, asking financial institutions to report potential Iranian abuse of religious charity networks, including the diversion of religious tithes called khums. Treasury announced it the same day as part of a campaign it calls Operation Economic Outcast. The alert is three pages long, draws on Bank Secrecy Act data, open-source reporting and law-enforcement information, and gives no figures: no number of organisations, no volume of money, no count of reports.
It describes two overlapping things.
- Institutions that look charitable but are not. The alert recalls that in 2020 the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the Islamic Revolution Mostazafan Foundation, which Treasury then described as “ostensibly a charitable organization” whose holdings were used by the Supreme Leader to enrich his office. It also recalls that OFAC designated the Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines in Iraq, which it says was controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and transferred millions of dollars to an Iraq-based IRGC-controlled company that served as a base for Iranian intelligence activity. Those are designations, which are agency findings, and the alert reports them rather than re-proving them.
- Collection of religious payments. Khums is the practice of giving a fifth of surplus annual income to religious institutions. FinCEN says it plays an important role in Shi’a communities, and also says that in some cases organisations collecting it do so on behalf of Iranian ayatollahs with ties to the regime, or on behalf of the Supreme Leader himself, and may use informal channels such as the hawala system and cash couriers to send the money to Iran or to Iran-linked actors.
One documented case
The alert’s example is a Justice Department case. In May 2024 Muzzamil Zaidi and Asim Mujtaba Naqvi, both of Houston, pleaded guilty to conspiracy and to violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. According to the Justice Department, Zaidi received permission in December 2018 to collect khums on behalf of several Imams, and between December 2018 and December 2019 the two men collected it, along with donations purportedly for victims of the civil war in Yemen, and arranged for the money to be exported to Iran and received by the Office of the Supreme Leader. Friends, family members and associates carried cash out of the United States in amounts under $10,000, and on one occasion a group of 25 travellers on a pilgrimage in Iraq hand-carried dollars to Iran. The transfer was unlawful because US sanctions prohibit providing funds to or for the benefit of the Supreme Leader of Iran. See the case page.
The sub-$10,000 amounts matter for detection. They sit below the threshold at which a bank files a Currency Transaction Report, which is one of the patterns the alert asks banks to watch for.
What a bank is asked to watch for
| Pattern in a charity or non-profit customer | Where it appears |
|---|---|
| Solicits donations but appears to provide no charitable services, or openly supports the Iranian regime or its proxies | FinCEN red flag 1 |
| Receives large donations from an unknown source over a short period, then wires or cheques significant sums to other charities | FinCEN red flag 2 |
| A pattern of behaviour suggesting efforts to avoid currency transaction reporting, such as cancelling a transaction when told a report would be filed, or repeated cash transactions under $10,000 | FinCEN red flag 3 |
| A customer with no clear business relationship to a charity receives transfers from it and then withdraws cash or remits the funds onward | FinCEN red flag 4 |
These are listed with their source quotations in the red-flag library. FinCEN adds that no single indicator is determinative, that banks should weigh a customer’s history, whether the activity fits normal practice for that kind of customer, and whether several flags appear together. It also reminds banks that legitimate charities should have access to financial services and should be handled with a risk-based approach to customer due diligence, as set out in a 2020 joint fact sheet. Institutions are asked to put the term FIN-2026-IRANCHARITYABUSE in the filing note of any suspicious activity report that follows the alert.
How it connects to the other Iranian techniques
The money has to reach Iran or someone acting for it, and the alert names the same informal routes described elsewhere on this site: hawala and cash couriers. The wider banking-side network FinCEN and Treasury describe for Iranian trade payments is covered on the exchange-house and rahbar networks page. The mechanism here differs in where the funds start. In the exchange-house network the funds are payments for trade. Here they are donations or religious payments collected from individuals, which is why the early warning signs are in a charity’s account behaviour rather than in an invoice.
What this page does not establish
- No scale. The alert and the Treasury release give no figures, so this page cannot say how much money, how many organisations or how many reports are involved.
- One named case. Besides the two 2020 designations, the Zaidi and Naqvi plea is the only enforcement example in the alert. This page does not report the sentences, because neither the release nor the alert gives them.
- Not a category. Collecting khums, running a charity or sending money to relatives abroad is not evidence of sanctions evasion. FinCEN’s alert makes the same distinction, and its indicators describe behaviour in an account, not the identity or faith of a customer.
- FinCEN’s characterisation. The statement that the Iranian regime abuses charities is Treasury’s. It is reported here as such.