Sanctions Evasion Reference

How are charities and religious networks used to move money for Iran?

Soliciting donations or religious payments such as khums through charities and informal collectors, then moving the money to Iran or Iran-linked actors by hawala, cash couriers or onward transfers. FinCEN describes this as regime abuse of charity, not charity.

also known as

charity network abuse, khums diversion

seen in

Islamic Republic of Iran

reviewed

2026-11-08

Cite this page
APA 7
Sanctions Evasion Reference. (2026, November 8). How are charities and religious networks used to move money for Iran? https://sanctionsevasion.org/techniques/charity-and-religious-network-abuse/
Chicago
Sanctions Evasion Reference. “How are charities and religious networks used to move money for Iran?” Last reviewed November 8, 2026. https://sanctionsevasion.org/techniques/charity-and-religious-network-abuse/.
BibTeX
@misc{ser-techniques-charity-and-religious-network-abuse,
  author = {{Sanctions Evasion Reference}},
  title  = {How are charities and religious networks used to move money for Iran?},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Last reviewed 2026-11-08},
  url    = {https://sanctionsevasion.org/techniques/charity-and-religious-network-abuse/}
}

The date is when this page was last reviewed, not when it was first published.

Legitimate charities and religious institutions move money across borders every day, and financial regulators say they should be able to. This page is about a narrower thing: what the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) says the Iranian government does with some organisations of this kind. It is FinCEN’s finding about a state’s conduct. It is not a description of charity, of Shi’a communities, or of any organisation that is not named in an enforcement action.

What FinCEN says

On 15 October 2026 FinCEN issued Alert FIN-2026-Alert008, asking financial institutions to report potential Iranian abuse of religious charity networks, including the diversion of religious tithes called khums. Treasury announced it the same day as part of a campaign it calls Operation Economic Outcast. The alert is three pages long, draws on Bank Secrecy Act data, open-source reporting and law-enforcement information, and gives no figures: no number of organisations, no volume of money, no count of reports.

It describes two overlapping things.

  • Institutions that look charitable but are not. The alert recalls that in 2020 the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated the Islamic Revolution Mostazafan Foundation, which Treasury then described as “ostensibly a charitable organization” whose holdings were used by the Supreme Leader to enrich his office. It also recalls that OFAC designated the Reconstruction Organization of the Holy Shrines in Iraq, which it says was controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and transferred millions of dollars to an Iraq-based IRGC-controlled company that served as a base for Iranian intelligence activity. Those are designations, which are agency findings, and the alert reports them rather than re-proving them.
  • Collection of religious payments. Khums is the practice of giving a fifth of surplus annual income to religious institutions. FinCEN says it plays an important role in Shi’a communities, and also says that in some cases organisations collecting it do so on behalf of Iranian ayatollahs with ties to the regime, or on behalf of the Supreme Leader himself, and may use informal channels such as the hawala system and cash couriers to send the money to Iran or to Iran-linked actors.

One documented case

The alert’s example is a Justice Department case. In May 2024 Muzzamil Zaidi and Asim Mujtaba Naqvi, both of Houston, pleaded guilty to conspiracy and to violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. According to the Justice Department, Zaidi received permission in December 2018 to collect khums on behalf of several Imams, and between December 2018 and December 2019 the two men collected it, along with donations purportedly for victims of the civil war in Yemen, and arranged for the money to be exported to Iran and received by the Office of the Supreme Leader. Friends, family members and associates carried cash out of the United States in amounts under $10,000, and on one occasion a group of 25 travellers on a pilgrimage in Iraq hand-carried dollars to Iran. The transfer was unlawful because US sanctions prohibit providing funds to or for the benefit of the Supreme Leader of Iran. See the case page.

The sub-$10,000 amounts matter for detection. They sit below the threshold at which a bank files a Currency Transaction Report, which is one of the patterns the alert asks banks to watch for.

What a bank is asked to watch for

Pattern in a charity or non-profit customerWhere it appears
Solicits donations but appears to provide no charitable services, or openly supports the Iranian regime or its proxiesFinCEN red flag 1
Receives large donations from an unknown source over a short period, then wires or cheques significant sums to other charitiesFinCEN red flag 2
A pattern of behaviour suggesting efforts to avoid currency transaction reporting, such as cancelling a transaction when told a report would be filed, or repeated cash transactions under $10,000FinCEN red flag 3
A customer with no clear business relationship to a charity receives transfers from it and then withdraws cash or remits the funds onwardFinCEN red flag 4

These are listed with their source quotations in the red-flag library. FinCEN adds that no single indicator is determinative, that banks should weigh a customer’s history, whether the activity fits normal practice for that kind of customer, and whether several flags appear together. It also reminds banks that legitimate charities should have access to financial services and should be handled with a risk-based approach to customer due diligence, as set out in a 2020 joint fact sheet. Institutions are asked to put the term FIN-2026-IRANCHARITYABUSE in the filing note of any suspicious activity report that follows the alert.

How it connects to the other Iranian techniques

The money has to reach Iran or someone acting for it, and the alert names the same informal routes described elsewhere on this site: hawala and cash couriers. The wider banking-side network FinCEN and Treasury describe for Iranian trade payments is covered on the exchange-house and rahbar networks page. The mechanism here differs in where the funds start. In the exchange-house network the funds are payments for trade. Here they are donations or religious payments collected from individuals, which is why the early warning signs are in a charity’s account behaviour rather than in an invoice.

What this page does not establish

  • No scale. The alert and the Treasury release give no figures, so this page cannot say how much money, how many organisations or how many reports are involved.
  • One named case. Besides the two 2020 designations, the Zaidi and Naqvi plea is the only enforcement example in the alert. This page does not report the sentences, because neither the release nor the alert gives them.
  • Not a category. Collecting khums, running a charity or sending money to relatives abroad is not evidence of sanctions evasion. FinCEN’s alert makes the same distinction, and its indicators describe behaviour in an account, not the identity or faith of a customer.
  • FinCEN’s characterisation. The statement that the Iranian regime abuses charities is Treasury’s. It is reported here as such.

Red-flag indicators

5 listed
01 A charitable organisation or NPO solicits donations but does not appear to provide any charitable services, or openly supports the Iranian regime or its terrorist proxies in fundraising appeals or on social media. FinCEN, 2026
“solicits donations but does not appear to provide any charitable services”

FinCEN, FinCEN Alert FIN-2026-Alert008, Red Flag Indicators for Iranian Abuse of Religious Charities (2026). Read the source document

02 A charitable organisation or NPO receives large donations from an unknown source over a short period and then sends significant wire transfers or cheques to other charities or NPOs. FinCEN, 2026
“receives large donations from an unknown source over a short period of time and then sends significant wire transfers or checks to other charitable organizations or NPOs”

FinCEN, FinCEN Alert FIN-2026-Alert008, Red Flag Indicators for Iranian Abuse of Religious Charities (2026). Read the source document

03 A charity or NPO, or one of its employees, officers or contractors, behaves in a pattern that suggests efforts to evade the Currency Transaction Report requirement, such as altering a transaction when told a report would be filed, or structuring cash below $10,000. FinCEN, 2026
“engages in a pattern of behavior suggesting efforts to evade the Currency Transaction Report (CTR) reporting requirement”

FinCEN, FinCEN Alert FIN-2026-Alert008, Red Flag Indicators for Iranian Abuse of Religious Charities (2026). Read the source document

04 A customer receives transfers from a charity or NPO with which it has no clear business relationship and then withdraws the funds in cash or sends them onward. FinCEN, 2026
“receives transfers from a charitable organization or NPO with which the customer has no clear business relationship and then proceeds to withdraw the funds in cash or remit them onward”

FinCEN, FinCEN Alert FIN-2026-Alert008, Red Flag Indicators for Iranian Abuse of Religious Charities (2026). Read the source document

05 A charity or association offers deposits, loans and transfers like a bank, far beyond what its registration documents describe. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026
“it provides financial services similar to a bank, far beyond anything disclosed in its original registration documents”

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury press release sb0546, Al-Qard Al-Hassan and Bayt al-Mal (2026). Read the source document

Each indicator above is quoted or paraphrased from the advisory or typology report named beside it. Expand a row for the citation. These are recognition aids drawn from published guidance, not a compliance checklist.

How it is detected

FinCEN's October 2026 alert gives four patterns for a bank to look for in a charity or non-profit customer: it solicits donations but appears to provide no charitable services, or openly supports the Iranian regime or its proxies; it receives large donations from an unknown source in a short period and then wires or cheques significant sums to other charities; it or its staff try to avoid currency transaction reporting; or a customer receives transfers from a charity with which it has no clear business relationship and then withdraws the cash or sends it on. FinCEN stresses that no single sign is determinative, and asks banks to weigh several together against the customer's history and to apply a risk-based approach rather than treat charities as high risk by category. A suspicious activity report that follows the alert carries the key term FIN-2026-IRANCHARITYABUSE.

Enforcement record

Documented outcomes on this site that turned on this technique.
Case Outcome Authority Date Penalty
Al-Qard Al-Hassan and the Hizballah treasury 2006–2026 Designation — — —
Khums and donations carried to Iran in cash 2018–2024 Criminal conviction — — —

Related techniques

  • What is hawala and how does informal value transfer work? — Settling obligations between brokers in different countries by netting them against each other, so a customer's payment reaches a recipient abroad without any funds crossing a border.
  • What are exchange-house and rahbar networks? — A parallel payment system in which Iranian exchange houses and bank-appointed rahbar companies use front companies abroad, mostly in Hong Kong and the UAE, to receive and pay foreign currency for sanctioned Iranian banks and exporters.
  • What are third-country bank accounts and how are they used? — Holding accounts in a jurisdiction unconnected to the restricted party, the goods or the contract, so that payments reach and leave the restricted economy without ever appearing to touch it.
  • What is a professional enabler? — A lawyer, accountant, formation agent or broker whose services are what makes a concealment structure work, and whose repeated involvement across unconnected clients is itself the evidence.

Where this appears

Sanctions programmes

  • Iran sanctions — A layered set of US, EU and UN measures dating from 1979 and substantially rebuilt after 2018, covering energy, finance, shipping, and proliferation-related procurement.

Terms used on this page

  • Khums — A religious payment in Shi'a Islam of a fifth of surplus annual income, which FinCEN says Iran has tried to divert to its own purposes.
  • Hawala — A value transfer arrangement in which brokers in different countries pay out to each other's customers and settle the resulting obligations between themselves later.
  • Informal value transfer system — Any arrangement that transfers value between parties without moving funds through the regulated banking system, settling obligations by netting or in kind.
  • Suspicious activity report — A confidential report filed by a regulated firm with its national financial intelligence unit when it knows or suspects that activity may involve criminal proceeds or sanctioned parties.
  • Customer due diligence — The ongoing process of understanding a customer's identity, ownership, expected activity and risk, and checking that actual activity remains consistent with it.

Further reading and sources

  1. FinCEN Alert to Counter Iranian Abuse of Religious Charity Networks (FIN-2026-Alert008). U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 2026. pp. 1-3; red flag indicators p. 3.
  2. Operation Economic Outcast Targets Iranian Regime's Abuse of Religious Charity Networks. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026. 15 October 2026.
  3. Scheme to Transfer Money to Iran Results in Guilty Pleas. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, 2024. press release 24-554, 1 May 2024.