Al-Qard Al-Hassan, usually shortened to AQAH, is a Lebanese lender that the US Treasury has described as Hizballah’s bank in all but name. The case is useful because the record is long: the same institution appears in Treasury releases from 2007, 2019, 2021 and 2026, and each one adds a layer to how a sanctioned group keeps a financial system running after its treasury has been listed. Everything below is Treasury’s account in its designation releases. None of it has been tested before a court.
The sequence in Treasury’s releases
- 2006: the treasury is listed. OFAC designated Bayt al-Mal, which Treasury calls Hizballah’s unofficial treasury, on 7 September 2006 under Executive Order 13224. Treasury says its offices were largely destroyed in the summer 2006 conflict.
- 2007: the lender takes over. On 24 July 2007 OFAC designated AQAH and the Martyrs Foundation. The release says Hizballah used AQAH “as a cover to manage its financial activity”, that AQAH took a more prominent role after the September 2006 listings, and that by February 2007 the accounts of Bayt al-Mal and a related company had been re-registered in the names of senior AQAH employees.
- 2019: a bank is listed for serving it. On 29 August 2019 Treasury designated Jammal Trust Bank and three insurance subsidiaries. The release says AQAH officials opened accounts there as “personal accounts” while identifying themselves as senior Hizballah members, and that the bank knew.
- 2021: the shadow accounts. On 11 May 2021 Treasury designated seven people, six of them AQAH officials. It says AQAH presents itself as a non-governmental organisation under a Ministry of Interior licence but provides bank-like services without proper licensing or supervision, and that officials held “shadow” and joint accounts at Lebanese banks. Treasury says five officials’ joint accounts moved more than $500 million through the formal system over a decade.
- February 2026: gold. On 10 February 2026 OFAC designated Jood SARL, a Lebanese gold exchange company. Treasury says AQAH set it up to evade sanctions, that a senior AQAH official co-owns it, and that it converts Hizballah’s gold reserves into usable funds. It adds that most Jood branches are in or near existing AQAH branches, and that AQAH pushed to open such companies quickly to ease liquidity pressure during 2025.
- June 2026: a joint listing. On 30 June 2026 the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center announced a joint designation of five entities and 16 individuals, including AQAH and Bayt al-Mal. The release says every target had already been designated by the United States. The release does not name the Center’s member states, so the action reads as a repeat listing by a wider group, not new US sanctions.
What the pattern shows
Read together, the releases describe a structure that adapts each time one part is listed. The treasury function moved into a licensed lender; accounts moved into the names of employees; employees’ personal and joint accounts carried transactions through banks that were later designated themselves; and, when liquidity tightened, gold was routed through a new dealer placed beside existing branches. The common feature is that the person on the account or the licence is not the listed body, which is why a name search against the SDN list returns nothing.
The cash side is described separately. Treasury’s 20 August 2026 release designates ten people in a courier network that moves cash between Lebanon, Türkiye, the UAE and Iran on commercial flights, and re-designates Hizballah as controlled by the IRGC-QF. That release does not mention AQAH, so the two should not be joined: one describes a network feeding Hizballah with foreign currency outside the banks, the other describes the institution that handles money inside Lebanon. The technique page on Hizballah cash couriers and quasi-banking sets both beside each other, and the abuse of a charity-style licence is covered under charity and religious network abuse.
Why it matters for screening
For a bank outside Lebanon the practical points come from the structure, not from any single release. Listed bodies can be reached through the people who held their accounts, so signing rights, joint accounts and the officers of any lender in the region deserve the same scrutiny as the lender. A newly licensed gold or exchange business that shares premises or ownership with a listed institution is a link Treasury itself drew in February 2026. And the 2019 action shows the exposure runs the other way: a bank that let listed officials use personal accounts was itself designated. The shared framework is on the counter-terrorism programme page.
What the record does not show
- Any court finding. These are designations and the agency’s own findings. The releases do not describe any prosecution of AQAH or its officials.
- Current balances. The $500 million figure is a flow over a decade through named officials’ accounts, not a stock of funds held, and Treasury does not give a total for AQAH.
- A link between the courier network and AQAH. The August 2026 release does not connect them.
- Detection. None of the releases says how the activity was first identified.
- The June 2026 member states. The release does not list them, so which governments adopted the listing is not established by the page.