Most sanctions penalties on this site end with a sentence about the company’s compliance program: missing, untested, or not applied to a business it had just bought. OFAC publishes what it looks for in one short document, A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments, issued in 2019. This page summarises it. Read the original for the exact wording; it runs to twelve pages.
It is guidance, and it matters anyway
OFAC’s regulations do not require a formal sanctions compliance program (SCP). The framework says so itself, and still strongly encourages one for organisations subject to US jurisdiction and for foreign entities that deal in or with the United States or use US-origin goods or services. The consequence shows up at penalty stage, in three places the framework spells out.
- Under the general factor for compliance programs, OFAC may consider the existence, nature and adequacy of an SCP, and may reduce a civil penalty on that basis.
- A program built on the five components may earn further mitigation under the general factor for remedial response, when it results in remedial steps being taken.
- In appropriate cases OFAC may weigh the existence of an effective program at the time of the violation in deciding whether a case is egregious. How the calculation works is covered on its own page.
OFAC may also decide which of the framework’s elements to write into a settlement agreement.
The five components
| Component | What the framework asks for |
|---|---|
| Management commitment | Senior management reviews and approves the program; gives the compliance unit enough authority, autonomy and direct reporting lines; resources it with people, expertise and technology; promotes a culture in which staff can report misconduct without fear of reprisal; and responds to violations with measures that address root causes. The framework suggests measuring resourcing by whether there is a dedicated sanctions compliance officer and by the quality and experience of staff. |
| Risk assessment | A routine, and where appropriate ongoing, review of customers, supply chain, intermediaries and counterparties; of products and services; and of geography, updated for the root causes of any violation. At onboarding, a sanctions risk rating guides how much due diligence follows. The framework singles out mergers and acquisitions, saying compliance should be integrated into the process and that issues should be addressed before the transaction closes. |
| Internal controls | Written policies and procedures that identify, interdict, escalate, report and keep records of prohibited activity. Controls must change quickly when OFAC updates a list, a program or a general licence. Where software is used it must be calibrated to the risk profile and routinely tested. On finding a weakness, put compensating controls in place until the root cause is fixed. |
| Testing and auditing | A testing or audit function that is independent of the activity it checks, accountable to senior management and properly resourced, covering either one element or the whole program. On a confirmed negative finding, act immediately with compensating controls until the cause is remedied. |
| Training | Periodic training, at a minimum annually, tailored to each employee’s job and to the organisation’s risk, with assessments to hold staff accountable. Training is expected to extend to stakeholders such as clients and suppliers where appropriate, and to follow any negative test result or audit finding. |
The ten root causes
An appendix lists ten causes that OFAC says it found behind program failures in its earlier enforcement actions. It calls the list non-exhaustive. The right-hand column is this site’s, not OFAC’s: pages here that illustrate the same failure.
| Root cause in the framework | Pages here |
|---|---|
| Lack of a formal program | How penalties are decided |
| Misinterpreting, or failing to understand, the regulations’ reach, including for foreign subsidiaries of US companies | How US sanctions reach non-US companies |
| Facilitating transactions by non-US persons, including overseas subsidiaries | Facilitation |
| Exporting or re-exporting US-origin goods, technology or services to sanctioned persons or countries | Dual-use re-export |
| Using the US financial system for commercial transactions involving sanctioned parties | Correspondent banking abuse |
| Screening software or filter faults | Untested screening controls |
| Improper due diligence on customers, including ownership | Ownership-threshold structuring |
| De-centralised compliance and inconsistent application | Acquisition-integration gaps |
| Non-standard payment or commercial practices | Third-country bank accounts |
| Individual liability | No page on this site yet |
The framework’s own text on two of these is worth knowing. On payments, it says that where no US person is involved in the underlying trade, the inclusion of a US financial institution in the payment chain often makes the activity prohibited. On non-standard practices, it says organisations that try to evade or circumvent sanctions “will implement non-traditional business methods” to complete their transactions, and that the organisations subject to US jurisdiction are in the best position to judge what is consistent with industry norms. That second point is the logic behind the red-flag library.
What it does not say
It does not say that having a program prevents a penalty. OFAC states that the framework applies when it evaluates a program, and that the Enforcement Guidelines govern the case. It also does not supply a checklist that can be passed or failed: the five components are “at least” the elements a program should incorporate, and the framework describes each as something an organisation commits to. Whether a program is effective is judged afterwards, on the facts.