Sanctions Evasion Reference

Fake ship registries sold to Iran's shadow fleet

Treasury sanctioned an India-based couple and their companies on 4 November 2026, finding that their fraudulent ship registries gave false flags and certificates to sanctioned tankers carrying Iranian oil.

period

2014–2026

outcome

Designation

parties

Suniel Kumar Sharma; Jaspreet Preeti Shahid; Eswatini Maritime Affairs and International Ship Registry PTE. Ltd.; Oceaniek Technologies India; Aryavart Ship Management Private Limited

programmes

Islamic Republic of Iran

reviewed

2026-11-08

Cite this page
APA 7
Sanctions Evasion Reference. (2026, November 8). Fake ship registries sold to Iran's shadow fleet. https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/sharma-fraudulent-ship-registries-2026/
Chicago
Sanctions Evasion Reference. “Fake ship registries sold to Iran's shadow fleet.” Last reviewed November 8, 2026. https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/sharma-fraudulent-ship-registries-2026/.
BibTeX
@misc{ser-cases-sharma-fraudulent-ship-registries-2026,
  author = {{Sanctions Evasion Reference}},
  title  = {Fake ship registries sold to Iran's shadow fleet},
  year   = {2026},
  note   = {Last reviewed 2026-11-08},
  url    = {https://sanctionsevasion.org/cases/sharma-fraudulent-ship-registries-2026/}
}

The date is when this page was last reviewed, not when it was first published.

On 4 November 2026 the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Suniel Kumar Sharma, Jaspreet Preeti Shahid, two people it describes as nominal directors and nine companies, most of them with addresses in Chandigarh, India. Treasury’s account is that the network ran fraudulent ship registries that sold false flags and certificates to sanctioned vessels carrying Iranian petroleum. A designation is Treasury’s finding under its own powers, not a court judgment, and this page reports it as such.

What Treasury says

  • Start date. Treasury dates the operation to as early as 2014, when, it says, Sharma and Shahid (whom it describes as spouses) sought to impersonate the flag authority of Dominica. OFAC’s alert of the same day frames it slightly differently: the network first provided legitimate flagging services for jurisdictions such as Dominica, Guyana, Eswatini and Nicaragua, which later ended those relationships.
  • A Singapore company. In 2023 Sharma set up Eswatini Maritime Affairs and International Ship Registry PTE. Ltd. in Singapore. Treasury says Eswatini’s authorities publicly disavowed it and that it still provides flags to vessels carrying Iranian petroleum, including at least one sanctioned tanker.
  • Registries without companies. Many of the registries, Treasury says, were only websites: the network bought domains and built sites offering flagging, seafarer training and certification, and vessel classification in the name of countries that had not authorised it. Treasury lists sites purporting to act for Aruba, Guyana, Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, Sint Maarten and Timor-Leste, among others.
  • An Indian technology company. Sharma is managing director of Oceaniek Technologies India, which Treasury says was used to set up registries purporting to belong to Aruba, Nicaragua and Sint Maarten. Through these registries, Treasury says, false flags went to numerous sanctioned vessels carrying Iranian petroleum products.
  • Closing down under scrutiny. After press coverage, Treasury says, Sharma closed several registries. One was the Laos Ship Registry and Maritime Safety Administration, previously the International Maritime Safety Agency of Guyana, which Treasury says served as a false flagging agency for Guyana and was likely intended to impersonate the Laotian government as well.
  • Nominees. Treasury says Shahid now manages the businesses, “at least on paper”, and that two Indian nationals, Ashwani Kumar Dhiman and Ishwinder Singh, serve nominally as directors of companies including Aryavart Ship Management Private Limited.
  • A seizure. Treasury reports that on 22 April 2026 the US Department of War seized a tanker carrying Iranian oil that was falsely flagged to Guyana.

What was designated

All designations were made under Executive Order 13902, which targets sectors of Iran’s economy. Treasury designated Sharma for operating in Iran’s petroleum sector, Shahid for supporting Sharma, and the two directors for acting for Aryavart Ship Management. The companies were designated as owned or controlled by, or acting for, Sharma or Shahid: Eswatini Maritime Affairs and International Ship Registry, Oceaniek Technologies India, Aryavart Ship Management, Precept Trends, Polynesia Maritime, Alexarya Finserv, Alexarya Media and Entertainment, Viharaboating and the Aryavart Maritime and Educational Trust. Each new entry on OFAC’s list carries the notation “Secondary sanctions risk: See Section 2 of E.O. 13902”. Section 2 is the part of the order that lets Treasury sanction a foreign bank that knowingly conducts or facilitates a significant transaction for a person blocked under it. Sharma’s entry also lists eight website addresses, several styled as national ship registries, so the sites themselves can be screened.

On the same day OFAC issued an alert on false flags, with five signs for service providers to check. The technique is explained on the false-flags page. The designations were part of Operation Economic Outcast, whose first ten weeks are counted in a data note.

What the record does not show

  • No criminal case. Neither document mentions charges in the United States, India or Singapore, or any action by Indian or Singaporean authorities.
  • No totals. Treasury does not say how many vessels the network flagged, how much it earned or how much oil those vessels carried.
  • The countries named. The states whose flags were used are described as impersonated or as having ended their relationship with the network. Nothing in the record is a finding against them.
  • Vessels. Treasury names several tankers. This site does not list vessels; their records are on the sister site’s false-flags page.

Techniques this case demonstrates

Programmes and jurisdictions in this case

  • Iran sanctions — A layered set of US, EU and UN measures dating from 1979 and substantially rebuilt after 2018, covering energy, finance, shipping, and proliferation-related procurement.
  • India — India-based traders, ship managers and a customs broker are among the entities the US named in 2025 for roles in Iranian oil, gas and petrochemical trade.
  • Singapore — A major trade financing, commodity trading and shipping centre whose intermediaries appear in enforcement records for the same volume reasons as other large hubs.

Enforcement documents and sources

  1. Operation Economic Outcast Targets Global Maritime Fraud Network Supporting Iranian Regime. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2026. Press release sb0681, 4 November 2026; section 'Sharma Criminal Network'.
  2. OFAC Alert: Iranian Shadow Fleet Reliance on False Flags for Sanctions Evasion. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2026. 4 November 2026; definitions p. 1, red flags p. 2.
  3. Iran-related Designations; Updates to Certain Iran-related Listings; Publication of Iran-related OFAC Alert. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, 2026. Recent Actions, 4 November 2026; SDN List updates.

All enforcement cases