The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is not under a country embargo. Its sanctions are conflict sanctions: they name armed groups, the people who lead and arm them, and those who profit from the minerals that pay for the fighting. That makes the exposure one of provenance and counterparties, not of geography. In 2026 the US widened the target set from rebel groups to Rwandan state bodies and a Rwandan financial institution.
United States
- Authority. Executive Order 13413 (27 October 2006), amended by Executive Order 13671 (8 July 2014), implemented through the DRC Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 547. Section 547.201 lets OFAC block armed-group leaders who impede disarmament, people responsible for threats to peace, attacks on civilians, use of children, or obstruction of aid, anyone who supports such activity “through the illicit trade in natural resources”, arms suppliers, material supporters and entities owned or controlled by a blocked person. Entries carry the tag [DRCONGO]; this site counted 100 such entries in the SDN file published on 13 November 2026.
- 2 March 2026. OFAC listed the Rwanda Defence Force and four named officers, citing support for the M23 movement, and issued DRC General License 1, a wind-down licence for dealings with the Force.
- 10 July 2026. General License 2 authorises transactions ordinarily incident to exports of agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices, and to medical care and clinical trials, in the DRC or Rwanda. It does not authorise any other prohibited transaction.
- 23 September 2026. OFAC removed seven entries: four for an individual described as head of the president’s military house, and three for a club linked to that individual. The notice gives no reason.
- 28 October 2026. OFAC listed the Rwandan Ministry of Defence and Zigama Credit and Savings Society under the same order. Treasury’s press release says the Ministry directs the Force’s deployments in North and South Kivu and says Zigama facilitated payments for weapons, ammunition and training, enabled the transport of gold from M23-controlled territory to Kigali, and handled transactions for M23 and the Congo River Alliance totalling tens of millions of dollars. These are Treasury’s findings. The notice names no general licence. A listed financial institution brings the 50 per cent rule and correspondent exposure into play for banks.
United Nations
The 1533 regime comprises an arms embargo on non-governmental entities and individuals in the DRC, a travel ban, an asset freeze, and aviation and customs measures. One listing criterion (paragraph 7(g) of resolution 2293 (2016)) covers supporting armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation or trade of natural resources, including gold. Resolution 2825, adopted unanimously on 29 June 2026, extended the regime to 1 July 2027 and the Group of Experts to 1 August 2027, and extended the measures to armed groups the Committee designates for obstructing the UN mission. On 14 July 2026 the Committee added six individuals and two entities, among them the Alliance Fleuve Congo, whose entry it amended on 11 November.
The Group of Experts is the main open evidence base. Its final report (S/2026/466, 5 June 2026) is the Group’s own assessment, not a Council finding. It estimated minimum alluvial gold output of three to eight tonnes at one Ituri site between March 2024 and March 2026, against declared Ituri exports of 559 kg for 2025, and assessed Uganda’s 2025 gold exports of about 62 tonnes ($6.4 billion) as largely of Congolese origin. It reported that Rwandan cassiterite exports rose 58 per cent in 2025, to 7,700 tonnes, beyond what domestic output explained. The Group asked Rwanda for clarification on 2 April 2026 and was awaiting a reply. Under resolution 1952 (2010) the Committee weighs whether a person exercised due diligence before listing them for supporting armed groups through the mineral trade, and the Council urges importers and processors to apply the Group’s guidelines.
European Union and United Kingdom
EU Decision 2010/788/CFSP carries UN-based listings and autonomous ones, including those “exploiting the armed conflict” through illicit trade in natural resources. Decision 2025/2507 of 8 December 2025 renewed the autonomous measures to 12 December 2026 and deleted one entry. The UK regime (S.I. 2019/433) gives an asset freeze, travel ban and director disqualification for designated people, bans military goods for non-governmental users in the DRC, and bars support that enables armed hostilities. UK notices record eight designations on 17 July 2026 and a variation on 12 November 2026.
What this means for evasion
None of the official pages read bans importing DRC gold, tin, tantalum or tungsten as such; the regimes act through listed persons. The practical risk is origin laundering: conflict-area material entering regional trading hubs and re-emerging as lawful output. See gold and commodity settlement, cargo origin blending and trade misinvoicing; export volumes that exceed recorded production are the signal the Group relies on (mirror statistics). For how listing works, see how designations work and the OFAC and UN pages.
What the record does not show
- A Security Council finding on Rwanda. The Group’s report and Treasury’s releases are their authors’ findings; Rwanda’s reply to the Group is not in the sources read.
- Reasons for the 23 September removals, or any OFAC licence for Zigama.
- EU follow-through. Whether the EU has transposed the July 2026 UN listings is not shown; the consolidated text read is dated 10 December 2025.
- UK names. The UK notices page does not name the eight designated.
- Mineral-trade laws outside sanctions, such as due-diligence reporting rules, were not reviewed.