This is not a case about disguise. The order describes a company that did not understand which of its products US export rules reached, and kept selling for four years after outsiders pointed to the rule. It is on this site because that gap is what the re-export techniques rely on, and because it ended with a civil penalty and a criminal declination in the same week.
What the order says
According to the Bureau of Industry and Security’s order of 16 June 2026, between 16 September 2020 and 26 September 2024 Bosch, through two German subsidiaries, sold, transferred or exported from abroad about $72,369,361 of MEMS sensor products and software to Huawei and its affiliates on the Entity List, including Huawei Tech. Investment Co., Ltd., Hong Kong, without a licence. BIS counted 109 violations. The subsidiaries are Bosch Sensortec GmbH and ETAS GmbH. The items were made abroad, but BIS treated them as subject to US export rules because Huawei carries a “footnote 1” designation on the Entity List, which extends the foreign direct product rule to products made with US software or technology.
The order sets out how the problem went unfixed. Among the points it records:
- Bosch’s export compliance staff, it says, lacked expertise and were short-staffed, and could not accurately advise the sensor unit about the rule’s effect on its business with Huawei. The unit relied on erroneous guidance for more than four years.
- In June 2023 a prospective contract chip manufacturer told the sensor unit it could not supply products destined for Huawei without authorisation, and cited the rule and a $300 million BIS penalty against another company. A compliance employee in Germany advised that the supplier’s position reflected an “internal policy” rather than a US requirement.
- Between 2021 and 2024 sensor-unit employees repeatedly signed supplier certifications that they would not provide such items to entities with a footnote 1 designation, and later explained they signed because they did not understand that Huawei was one.
The two outcomes
BIS assessed a civil penalty of $36,184,680, of which $32,583,651 was payable within 30 days and $3,601,029 was suspended until Bosch paid it as disgorgement under an agreement with the Justice Department, after which it counts toward the penalty. The settlement agreement records that Bosch filed a voluntary self-disclosure with BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement, cooperated, and admitted the conduct in the charging letter.
On 17 June 2026 the Justice Department’s National Security Division announced it had declined to prosecute Bosch, in what it called its first declination under the Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. Bosch had disclosed to the Division, cooperated and remediated, and agreed to disgorge $11,430,098 in profits. The release says a portion of the disgorgement is credited toward the civil penalty. The Division’s role is described on its authority page.
What to take from it
- Self-disclosure was rewarded visibly. The criminal outcome was a declination, which the Department attached to disclosure, cooperation and remediation, and to the absence of aggravating circumstances. The civil penalty remained large.
- The warnings came from outside. Suppliers raised the rule, according to the order, and the answers inside the company were wrong.
- Two agencies, one set of facts. The same conduct produced a Commerce penalty and a Justice Department declination on consecutive days, with a payment credited between them.
The order’s findings are BIS’s, agreed in a settlement in which Bosch admitted the conduct. It is not a finding that anyone at Huawei or Bosch intended to evade controls, and the order does not say so.